Part 1B
Sept 11: Unanswered Questions
Flights 11,175, 93
by MalcontentX
for Main Page:http://www.communitycurrency.or/MainIndexMX.html

[Note to Readers: By your intent to read Part 1B,
we assume that you have already read Part 1A, (concerning Flight 77);
as such, you are to be commended for your willingness
to take the time that is necessary to inform yourself, (no small matter).
Many are those who become so burdened with the weight
of words, as to give up the search at the first sign of fatigue.
This burden is found in the ground of social, economic, and spiritual oppression,
where few of us have the time or energy to devote to a serious study of a serious situation.
Thus, one of our most powerful means of achieving freedom -the interior light of the mind-
is often left to the darkness of easy explanations echoing off a sea of silent souls.
You who choose to persevere shall not long know the light in isolation.

Flight 11

Flight 11 took off from Boston’s Logan Airport at 7:59 am.

Approximately twenty minutes into the flight, (8:20) Flight 11 stops transmitting its’ IFF (transponder) beacon. (CNN, Sept 16th, ibid)

The Village Voice of Sept 13th adds,

When the flight was 15 to 20 minutes out, the controller gave the pilot the OK to ascend from 29,000 to 31,000 feet. Nothing happened. The controller repeated his permission to go up. Still nothing. He tried to contact the pilot on the emergency frequency. No answer. Then the controllers noticed the plane's transponders, which tells them the aircraft's altitude, had stopped working, no longer sending a radar pulse."

According to the following source,

the New York Times of Sept 13 said much the same thing,

"The plane held on course, almost due west, for only 16 minutes.... Just past Worcester, Mass., instead of taking a southerly turn, the Boeing 767 swung to the north at 8:15. It had been taken over . . . "Five minutes later, at 8:20, Flight 11 failed to follow an instruction to climb to its cruising altitude of 31,00 feet. It was this point that air controllers suspected something was wrong. And just about then the plane's transponder, a piece of equipment that broadcast its location, went out."

"A Plane Left Boston and Skimmed Over River and Mountain in a Deadly Detour."

We should remember here that, although Flight 11 was no longer sending a specific transponder signal, it was still giving off a generalized radar; thus,

"an Air Force facility in Rome, N.Y., tracks planes based solely on the radar reflection off the skin of the aircraft. That alone would allow the Air Force to track the flight." (MSNBC, Sept 12)

The Village Voice article continues,

"At 8:28 the radar showed the jet veer south."

Our graphic radar map,

shows Flight 11 way off course, (thirty miles or more) by the time that it veered south -and that it must have, indeed, begun to go off-course at around the time that transponder /cockpit contact was first lost.

To review thus far:

at 8:15, Flight 11 begins to go off-course. At 8:20, Boston ATC loses radio and transponder contact with the plane. At 8:28, Flight 11 veers sharply south.

The FAA’s Boston Center knew... that Flight 11 had made a dramatic, roughly 100-degree left-hand turn to the south. (MSNBC, ibid)

Let’s briefly recall our documentation from Part 1A, (Flight 77) for rules regarding airline emergencies.

Re: flight path

"Pilots are supposed to hit each fix with pinpoint accuracy. If a plane deviates by 15 degrees, or two miles from that course, the flight controllers will hit the panic button.... When golfer Payne Stewart’s incapacitated Learjet missed a turn at a fix, F-16 interceptors were quickly dispatched." (MSNBC, Sept 12, ibid)

Re: transponder/radio contact

"Consider that an aircraft emergency exists ... when: ...There is unexpected loss of radar contact and radio communications with any ...aircraft."

--FAA Order 7110.65M 10-2-5

And what do the fighter planes typically do?

"[Marine Corps Major Mike] Snyder, the NORAD spokesman, said its fighters routinely intercept aircraft.

"When planes are intercepted... typically handled with a graduated response. The approaching fighter may rock its wingtips to attract the pilot's attention, or make a pass in front... can fire tracer rounds in the airplane's path, or... down it with a missile."

--'Boston Globe,' 15 September 2001 (ibid)

So first off, the emergency begins when the plane begins to go off-course at 8:15.

[Note: We can see here the confused nature of the N. Y. Times piece, [a document yet to be located, admittedly] which suggests that it was five minutes after the plane was off-course "that air controllers suspected something was wrong." A commercial airliner with one hundred+ passengers on board in the busiest of airspaces is a serious emergency. Five minutes is a long time. If the above reporting is accurate, it would be most interesting to see a transcript of the conversations between the pilots and ATC while they still had contact. [i.e. What would the pilots be saying to explain their being well off-course for that long?].

Five minutes later, at 8:20, transponder/cockpit contact with Flight 11 is lost; and what does Boston ATC do?

It appears they did essentially nothing until 8:38.

Boston ATC notifies NORAD that Flight 11 has been hijacked at 8:38 (CNN, Sept 16, ibid), eighteen minutes after the transponder signal first went silent -twenty-three minutes after the plane was off-course.

This seems rather negligent, (and/or out of the ordinary) does it not?

Standard FAA procedure, when radar and cockpit contact is lost, (and when the plane goes off-course) would appear to be: get a plane up in the air to regain contact with the pilot.

Now, whether this "standard," "routine procedure" is actually acted upon, (and to what standard of proficiency) is still open to question. Our latest understanding of the "Payne Stewart" incident, is that it took over twenty-minutes for the Air Force to be called in after radio control was lost, (see note 13 for a correction on earlier analysis). A crucial difference here, of course, is that the "Stewart" plane was carrying four passengers in relatively remote airspace, (higher altitudes) while Flight 11 was in very busy airspace with, (usually) a hundred+ passengers, and its transponder signal had also been turned off.

The kicker here, of course..... is that at approximately 8:28, ten minutes before NORAD says ATC contacted them, the air traffic controllers confirmed that the plane had been hijacked.

"The plane turned [south toward New York], and then they heard the transmission with the terrorist in the background....The voice upset [the controller] because he knew right then that he was working a hijack. Several other people heard the voice, and they could tell by the sound of it, intuitively, that this was a bad situation..... the Nashua [New Hampshire] controllers didn't know when the military was contacted, but said it was routine to do so immediately when a hijacking is under way. (Christian Science Monitor, quoted in both the MSNBC and Village Voice articles, cited above)

Thirteen minutes after a commercial airline goes way off-course, eight minutes after radar/transponder contact is lost, and it takes ATC ten more minutes to contact NORAD and tell them the plane has been hijacked?

An off-course/no contact airliner is a standing emergency. A possible hijacking is only the most logical of scenarios to consider.

It is not necessary for ATC to wait until a hijacking is confirmed, in order to contact NORAD or an ANG base.

Whether or not partial contact is regained, whether or not those intercepts actually get in the air, (or are called-off) the ATC/FAA should have at least notified civilian air defence immediately... as if

"an aircraft emergency exists."

Whether ATC tried to contact local ANG bases, (Air National Guard) or not, we do not know; whether NORAD was contacted earlier and simply did not respond, is still a possibility. Practically everything about these issues is being kept secret by the FBI and other agencies. The critical evidence we do know is that NORAD was (supposedly) not informed until twenty-three minutes after the emergency existed, and ten minutes after a hijacking had been confirmed.

This is serious negligence, no?

Occuring on the same day as the even more-negligent monitoring of Flight 77, (Part 1A) this has to raise serious doubts in the minds of readers -as to what else was going on... that day... besides the hijackings, that may have allowed them to occur, and what needs to be done on the level of civilian defense, (not secret service enhancements) to make sure this doesn't happen again.

We need an open, thorough, public investigation.

And there's still more.

When NORAD was (apparently) contacted, it took them another six minutes to contact an air base.

--8:44 a.m.: Otis Air National Guard Base in Mass. orders fighters to scramble. (CNN, Sept 16, ibid)

and this, one minute after

--8:43 a.m.: FAA notifies NORAD that United Airlines flight 175 has been hijacked.

Why would it take six minutes for NORAD to get the hijack-confirmation, choose an appropriate air base, make a phone call -and for that to be translated into an order to scramble?

One, two, three minutes, maybe; but six?

Now we’re up to twenty-nine minutes -between the time when officials first lost contact with Flight 11, and when the order to get jets in the air was given.

This is absurd; and, as we have documented an even greater degree of negligence in the case of Flight 77, (Part 1A) we can thus see that this was no "fluke," no "isolated accident," no infrequent "bad day at the office."

We don’t yet know where the exact disconnect point is, (ATC? FAA? NORAD?) but we can clearly see a repeated, glaring gap in credible response time.

By 8:38 Flight 11 was already nearing the outskirts of New York City, eight minutes away from its target.

Now notice what Air Base NORAD chooses to scramble fighters from: Otis Air Force Base, on the eastern-most tip of Massachusetts, (Cape Cod, on the Atlantic coast).

This is about two-hundred miles away from where Flight 11 was.

Wouldn’t it have made sense to order jets to scramble from a closer base?

As it was, it was already too late for Flight 11.

It struck the WTC at 8:46am, (CNN, April 16, ibid). The intercept planes would not be in the air for another six minutes.

--8:52 a.m.: Two F-15 Eagles take off from Otis ANG Base in effort to intercept hijacked plane(s) after first plane has struck the World Trade Center. (CNN, Sept 16, ibid)

It had taken civilain air defense thirty-seven minutes to get fighter-intercepts into the air, from the first point of an emergency.

It would take those jets another seventeen minutes to get to New York City.

Why wouldn’t NORAD order other planes from other bases to scramble, as well? -far closer to the hijacked plane(s)?

The significance of this non-order becomes huge, when we consider that it came one minute after NORAD was informed that Flight 175 had also been hijacked, (8:43/44). (CNN, Sept 16, ibid)

Flight 175


In the space of five minutes, officials at NORAD were made aware that two planes had been hijacked, and were presently within about fifty miles from one another, (just outside New York).

We are not told how or why ATC/FAA officials knew that Flight 175 was hijacked; but based on the record of Flights 77 and 11, it may be safe for us to assume that there was another glaring delay -between the time when trouble was first observed, and when NORAD was first notified.

Now, NORAD would also be among the first to know that Flight 11 had struck a building, (at 8:46, ibid).

Was this not an extreme emergency?

By this time, Flight 175 was thirty-one minutes into its doomed forty-eight minute flight-path. This would place it approximately half-way between Albany and New York City, (50 miles north of NYC) two-hundred miles from Otis Air Force Base, and heading in the opposite direction, (towards Baltimore).

It would have only made the most elementary sense for NORAD, (or ATC) to order other jets scrambled, from other bases closer to the plane -and in a position to intercept it.

Outside Philadelphia, for example, at Willow Grove Air Reserve Station, is 111 Fighter wing, whose "Mission Statement" is,

"To maintain highly trained, well-equipped, and motivated military forces in order to provide combat-ready A-10 aircraft for wartime requirements. To provide trained personnel to support state and local authorities in time of natural disaster or civil strife at the command of the Governor." 111th FW Home Page

and further,

"the 111th Fighter Wing has a state mission to protect the safety and security of the citizens and property of the state of Pennsylvania."

A "battle-ready" squadron of F-16’s were also stationed with the 177 Fighter Wing out of Atlantic City, less than half the distance from New York City, compared to Otis AFB.

Such bases, of course, are not only restricted to defending the air-space within their own state line.

File no. 108101. Military Support to Civil Authorities:
Section 2.6

  • Emergencies or disasters will often transcend jurisdictional boundaries or a state’s capability to respond…. An Interstate Compact constitutes the legal basis for mutual assistance among member jurisdictions. search.asp

  • Now, it is true that escorts/intercepts are usually scrambled from NORAD bases, such as the Otis Air Force Base near Cape Cod, Massachusetts, or the air base at Langley, Virginia; but this not always the case:

    "Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action. However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission. When the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC [National Military Command Center, in the Pentagon] will advise the FAA hijack coordinator the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft. NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and the designated military unit."

    --FAA Order 7610.4J 7-1-2

    Thus, when Payne Stewart's Lear jet went off course:

    "First, a fighter jet from Tyndall, Fla., was diverted from a routine training flight to check out the Learjet. Two F-16s from another Florida base then picked up the chase, later handing it over to two Air National Guard F-16s from Oklahoma, which handed it over to two F-16s from Fargo, North Dakota."

    'ABC News,' 25 October 1999 ( ibid)

    We are told by military officials that,

    "The pilots flew 'like a scalded ape,' topping 500 mph but were unable to catch up to the airliner.."

    If we take this "official" speed, (just under 10 miles/minute) and calculate the distance, (approx. 190 miles, calculated from online Yahoo maps) it would have taken the planes from Otis about twenty minutes to reach Flight 175’s last known position; and judging from Flight 175’s last known speed and direction, (precise speed unknown, let's say 300 mph) in twenty minutes the airliner would still be another one hundred miles away.

    So we can see that it would take about thirty minutes for the Otis fighters to reach Flight 175.

    If, on the other hand, NORAD ordered jets to scramble from outside Philadelphia, (at say, 8:50, and even allowing for the eight minutes it took the Otis fighters to get into the air) those jets could be expected to make visual contact with Flight 175 in approximately thirteen minutes.

    If Atlantic City had been chosen, two planes could have scrambled and flown the less than one-hundred miles (to intercept) in less than twenty minutes.

    Neither of these bases received an order to scramble.

    Again, we see the same pattern as in the case of Flight 77, (Part 1A); in both cases: significant, then incredible FAA delays in notifying NORAD, and NORAD choosing bases which are far away.

    This picture is further complicated by the fact that, according to the Federation of American Scientists,

    the top speed of the F-15 is over 1800 mph.

    This top speed is rarely achieved, given the weight of weapons and extra fuel; but given the extreme nature of the emergency, would it not be reasonable to assume that the F-15's should have achieved a speed of at least 1,000 or 1,200 mph? about 20 miles/minute?

    Apparently, that's not what happened.

    According to the NORAD timeline, (CNN, Sept. 16, ibid) the two F-15's left Otis AFB at 8:52. When Flight 175 strikes the World Trade Center at 9:02, (ten minutes later) the

    "F-15 fighter jets from Otis ANG Base are still 70 miles away."

    If we calculate the distance between OTIS and NYC, (about 190 miles, see note 14) and the time it took the planes to get there, they flew about twelve miles per minute, or 720 mph: less than half their top speed, hardly what we'd expect.

    In total then, it took civilain air defence, (on Sept. 11, 2001) fifty-five minutes to get two fighters to an interception point, (NYC, ten minutes flight-time away) after the initial airline emergency had commenced.

    Even given the discrepencies over the "official" flight speed, we should also remember that, if ATC or NORAD had responded to Flight 11 in a reasonable amount of time, numerous other bases in the area could have been called upon to put jets in the air, such as,

    The 104 Fighter Wing, (ANG) out of Westfield, Massachusetts, (center/west part of the state)

    The 174 Fighter Wing, (ANG) out of Syracuse, New York, (which was directly in Flight 11’s flight-path, until it turned south)

    Or the 103, or 118 Fighter Wings, (ANG) twenty miles north of Hartford, Connecticut, (100 miles N/E of NYC).

    The "state" mission of 174 Fighter Wing, for example, is as follows:

    "protection of life and property, and preserves peace, order and public safety. State missions, which are funded by the state, include disaster relief in times of earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and forest fires; search and rescue; protection of vital public services; and support to civil defense."

    [NOTE: This author is not suggesting that all of these bases had jets on "strip alert," ready-to-go; yet, as we discuss the "official" explanations for the Air Force delay/absence in some detail in Part 1E, it seems rather incredible to suggest that none of the numerous bases with "battle-ready" fighter squadrons had any jets ready, nor that there weren't already a few jets in the air, on routine training missions, when the emergencies began].

    As most American citizens know very well, the primary, stated purpose of the Air National Guard is civil defence.

    For some reason, even though this was the most extreme of civil emergencies, no other jets were scrambled on Sept 11 -besides those under the direct control of NORAD, (Otis and Langley, as we shall see).

    All the other National Guard bases were left un-activated.

    Even given the outrageous twenty-nine minute delay in responding to Flight 11, (which irrevocably doomed it to its’ fate) jets still should have been scrambled from Westfield, MA., Hartford CT., Philadelphia, or Atlantic City; and they would have then been in the air in time to intercept Flight 175.

    As it was, Flight 175 made a sharp turn south, (towards Atlantic City) which would have brought it into closer range with both 111, and 177 Fighter Wings.

    --8:50 a.m.: United Airlines flight 175 deviates from its assigned flight path. (CNN, Sept 16, ibid)

    IF NORAD had acted decisively -even after the first confirmed attack on the World Trade Centre- there still would have been a chance to avert the second attack, but the needed order to scramble additional jets never came.

    --9:02 a.m.: United Airlines flight 175 strikes the World Trade Center's south tower (F-15 fighter jets from Otis ANG Base are still 70 miles away.) (CNN, Sept 16, ibid)

    Thus it was colossal incompetence/negligence, (and perhaps something more) which allowed two hijacked planes to crash into the World trade Center towers -as had also been the case, (only moreso) for Flight 77, (see Part 1A).

    Thousands of American citizens would not have lost their lives if ATC, FAA, NORAD, and/or Pentagon officials had done their jobs, (though again, we don’t yet know exactly whom, and to what degree).

    The same pattern of incompetence remains:

    For Flight 11, no effective actions were taken to regain visual contact, (via an escort) once cockpit/transponder contact with an off-course airliner had been lost.

    A response only occurred twenty-nine minutes after the plane had been off course, without radio/transponder contact, and at least ten minutes after it had been obviously hijacked.

    In the case of both Flight 11 and 175, the base chosen to scramble jets from was a great distance away, (relative to numerous other fighter-bases). The planes flew at less than half their top speed -proving themselves utterly incapable of defending the citizens and property of New York City.

    Was Boston ATC in charge of both flights?

    Who was responsible for the ensuing decisions made at NORAD?

    By the close proximity of attack-times between the two planes, and the outrageously long response-time/ineptitude of ATC/FAA and/or NORAD, two cargoes of innocents were condemned to an infamous fate.

    In this, let us be perfectly clear: the source of our outrage is not for vengeance against those who may have unconsciously donned the uniform of criminal negligence on Sept 11; for, even when thousands of lives are lost, the heart of a nation can be very large. We may yet choose to understand that, in the midst of a crisis, some people in positions of high authority may have "lost their heads," "missed their cue" -when their skills and training were most needed.

    What we cannot countenance, however, is being lied to; and so long as the government utterly refuses to acknowledge the criminal negligence that the available documentation clearly implies, then the possiblity that there are very good and reasonable explanations for the security failure on Sept 11th remains on very thin ground indeed.

    Flight 93


    The general timeline for the final voyage of Flight 93 is as follows:

    --8:42 a.m.: United Airlines flight 93 takes off from Newark
    International Airport, bound for San Francisco. [Note: the plane was forty minutes late departing...
    originally scheduled to depart at 8:00 am].

    --9:16 a.m.: FAA informs NORAD that United Airlines flight 93 may have
    been hijacked.

    --9:40 a.m.: Transponder signal from United flight 93 ceases and radar
    contact is lost.

    --10:02 a.m.: After a review of radar tapes, a radar signal is detected
    near Shanksville, Pennsylvania

    CNN, Sept 16. ibid


    By numerous accounts, Flight 93 is believed to have crashed at 10:06 EST, or a few minutes after. (See Note 15)

    Many of us will remember, during the first few hours after the crash, hearing reports that Flight 93 was shot down by a military plane.

    This was flatly denied by the White House and military officials, and the mention of it was soon dropped in the media coverage.

    There is much evidence to suggest that Flight 93 was shot down, (which we shall discuss in a subsequent report). An excellent resource for information on this is available at (.)

    From the standpoint of our inquiry so far, the question of whether the plane was shot down or not is largely irrelevant.

    If a military plane had shot down the airliner, (after three other planes had devastated three highly populated buildings) few people would have found fault with the military for carrying out the gruesome task.

    In fact, it is far more damning of the U.S. Air Force, and civilian defense, that officials are claiming there were not any fighters in the immediate vicinity.

    Let’s take a closer look at the timeline.

    According to the above CNN report, (based on NORAD’s own statement) the FAA informed NORAD that Flight 93 had been hijacked at 9:16.

    The plane crashed at 10:06.

    That means it was in the air, hijack-confirmed for almost an hour, (fifty minutes) with no jets intercepting it -after two planes had struck the World Trade Center.

    Is this not incredible?

    We are told that the FAA informed NORAD that Flight 77, (the third plane) "may have been hijacked" at 9:25; and only then, at 9:27, did NORAD order jets to be scrambled from Langley.

    But why, (for God’s sake) did NORAD not order jets to be scrambled from Langley at 9:16, when first informed that Flight 93 had been hijacked? -after the first two planes had struck?

    If they had immediately ordered jets airborne at 9:16, the F-16’s from Langley would have actually made it to Washington before Flight 77 struck the Pentagon, (9:38).

    If NORAD had responded as it is mandated to do, the F-16’s from Langley would have caught up to Flight 93 soon after it altered its course near Cleveland.

    Nor would fighters from Langley have been the most logical squadrons to call upon.

    Andrews Air Force base would have been closer.

    Near Toledo, Ohio, less than 100 miles west of Cleveland, is 180 Fighter Wing, and about thirty miles west of Columbus Ohio, is 178 Fighter wing.

    Also, recall from the earlier reports, (cited above) that F-16/15 Fighters were scrambled from both, Langley AFB and Andrews AFB, for protection over Washington, D.C.

    From those reports, which said the Andrew’s planes were in the air "within minutes" of the Flight 77 crash into the Pentagon, (at 8:38) (Sunday Telegraph) -and the Langley planes which arrived at about 9:49, (CNN. Sept 16, ibid) eleven minutes after the crash- we can reasonably assume there was extra fighter-power over Washington by 9:50.

    Furthermore, Flight 93 was widely believed to be headed toward Washington. It had made a 180-degree turn over Cleveland, and was heading in the direction of the capital.

    Recall the radar map, previously cited,


    "As we walked, a voice over a fire truck loud speaker told everyone to move as far away from the Pentagon as possible due to a second plane coming toward the Pentagon. Evidently, this plane was American Flight #93 that crashed east of Pittsburgh."

    Lt. Col. Alan Maitland, Pentagon employee

    and further,

    At 9:30 a.m., six minutes after receiving their orders from the defense sector, code-named Huntress, three F-16's were airborne, according to the Norad timeline. Then the pilots received the most surreal order of the awful morning.

    "A person came on the radio," General Haugen said, "and identified themselves as being with the Secret Service and he said, `I want you to protect the White House at all costs.' "

    Tuesday October 16 'We Have Some Planes,' Hijacker Told Controller
    By MATTHEW L. WALD with KEVIN SACK, The New York Times(16)

    When Flight 93 crashed east of Pittsburgh, it was approximately 150 miles away from Washington, (approximately twenty minutes away, by airliner, at 400 mph, or fourteen minutes away, by super-sonic jet).

    The FAA had ordered all commercial planes to be grounded at 9:25.

    There were very few planes left in the sky. There would have been virtually no other planes on radar that could have threatened Washington, D.C., (even without the extra fighters in the air) -that is, besides the hijacked plane which had reversed course and was barreling towards Washington at a ferocious speed.

    If the main priority of those jets was to protect Washington, why were some of them not sent to intercept flight 93? even at 9:50? -well before the crash, some sixteen minutes later?

    If there were no fighters in the vicinity of Flight 93 when it crashed, there bloody-well should have been.

    Apparently some of these planes were eventually ordered to intercept; but we have not been told when, and how close they were; and again, they appeared to arrive upon the scene about ten minutes after the plane had crashed -in a now familiar pattern.

    Although we will cover other aspects of Flight 93, in the document, FURTHER Unanswered Questions, (Part 2) a very complete and well-referenced examination of this matter may be found at,


    13) Dear Reader, I regret to note that I, amongst other writers, was in error in my initial reading of the "Payne Stewart" incident. ( The confusion arose from the fighter-intercept's crossover from Eastern to Central Daylight time. Instead of the plane taking "eighteen" minutes to be "vectored into position," it appears to have taken over an hour. Whereas I had earlier quoted another report, ( which said, "departs. 9:24... pilot responds to an instruction from air traffic control. 9:33... The controller radios another instruction. No response from the pilot... For 4 ˝ minutes the controller tries to establish contact. 9:38.... the controller calls in the military..." -it is not clear exactly when the military was called in. (According to USA Today, it took twenty-four minutes). There are a number of factors which should be taken into account here, in trying to assess the comparative value: i.e. the "Stewart" plane was heading at higher speed than commercial, away from the the Florida base; it was at a high altitude; it was not a commercial airline with hundreds of passengers on board, transponder operational, no hijacking, etc. The MSNBC report, ( of Sept. 12, says that "interceptors were quickly dispatched" during this incident. Now, it's possible that the NTSB document has been doctored, (not a first for government web pages). The fact that a fighter was already in the air, yet took forty minutes to catch up to the jet, along with the report that the "Stewart" plane was "handed over from the pilot of one Florida base to another," suggests much confusion. All of this merely re-iterates the importance of getting some hard statistics on this, and numerous other flight incidents, that we may clearly establish routine procedure, responses achieved, and so on. I apologize for any inaccurate impression my reading of this document may have caused.
    At any rate, this error on my part holds very little significance to the facts taken as a whole. Having been removed from this document, I believe the reader would have to agree that this document still stands justified in its call for a thorough, public investigation.

    14)The distance between Otis AFB and New York City is about 188 miles,

    [NOTE: According to the following site,

    the air mile distance between Boston and New York City is 188 miles. A look on a map located through shows that Otis AFB is on the outer edge of Cape Cod, (on the shores of the Atlantic). Thus, it appears as if Otis is as far, (if not further) from New York City as Boston. I include this rather lengthy explanation here, due to the fact that numerous other sources have repeatedly under-estimated the distance by a wide margin.]

    If we subtract the 70 miles from the 188, that leaves about 118 miles that the F-15's travelled in ten minutes. That's about twelve miles per minute, or 720 mph.

    15)10:06, Pittsburg Post-Gazette, Sept 13,

    10:10, Washington Post, Sept 12
    16)10: 06 NY Times online, Note: the reference to this NY Times article is from the site of Holocaust denier David Irving. This simply shows that relevant information can sometimes be gained from sources that are otherwise suppliers of consistent dis-information.

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  • Continue on to Part 1C:
    Summation of Civilian Air Defense: Who is to Blame?